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CLIMATE FINANCE AND ITS GOVERNANCE: MOVING TO A
LOW CARBON ECONOMY THROUGH SOCIALLY
RESPONSIBLE FINANCING?
BENJAMIN J RICHARDSON*
Abstract 'Climate finance' is becoming an important feature of the emerg-
ing legal and policy regimes to address global warming. However, the cur-
rent approach largely confines the financial sector to a transactional agent to
mobilise capital for clean energy and to broker emission allowance trading.
The sector's potential to leverage more sweeping positive changes in the
economy as sought historically through the movement for socially respon-
sible investment (SRI) has been insufficiently acknowledged. Indirectly, by
regulating greenhouse gases the legal system is helping to create a business
case for investors to respond to climate change threats. However, the
potential contribution of SRI to address climate change problems more
comprehensively is presently limited owing to inadequate governance
frameworks, as well the sector's increasing abandonment of its traditional
ethical agenda.
1. INTRODUCTION
To what extent, and how, can financial markets contribute to climate policy
goals? Amidst the mounting international urgency to combat global warming,
the financial sector has become an increasingly prominent stakeholder. The
Kyoto Protocol's inclusion of various economic mechanisms to achieve cost
effective reductions of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, created a framework
for financial institutions such as banks and pension funds to play a seminal
role in the transition to a low carbon economy.' They would be able to act
as brokers for carbon trading, and as financiers for clean development and
climate adaptation. Until recently, however, another role of financial markets
has been somewhat overlooked in the climate policy debates. It is the move-
ment for socially responsible investment (SRI).
Rather than limiting financial institutions to mere transactional agents in
climate finance, SRI envisions a much more active and enlightened role for
* Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Canada. brichardson@osgoode.yorku.cg
1 Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (1998) 37 ILM 22.
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them. Traditionally, SRI has expected financiers to act as ethical investors,
who prioritise socially just and ecologically sustainable development over the
maximisation of financial returns. In other words, the financial sector should
act in the public interest rather than merely for its own economic self-interest.
By this approach, SRI promises a radical path to a low carbon world, whereby
the financial sector may exploit its economically strategic position to leverage
positive changes in corporate behaviour. If successful, SRI can overcome the
limitations and gaps in official climate regulation by pushing for early cor-
porate action to reduce GHG emissions.
However, SRI is not a textbook manual for social responsibility, but rather a
fluid discourse open to diverse interpretations and practices. In recent years,
particularly since 2000, that discourse has changed profoundly. 3 Many
SRI actors have jettisoned pretensions to invest solely on 'ethical' grounds;
instead, they are motivated primarily by a 'business case' whereby social and
environmental problems, including global warming, are addressed on the basis
of the relative financial risks and opportunities to the investor. A second
important transformation in SRI is the propagation of an array of codes of
conduct and other governance standards for responsible finance. Several of
these regimes specifically target climate change issues, such as the Carbon
Disclosure Project. In general, this trend in SRI governance has tended to
reinforce the drift to the business case approach.
This article assesses the contribution of SRI to climate finance and the
transition to a low carbon economy. Taking a comparative and international
perspective of the subject, it examines in particular the relationship between
SRI and the mechanisms for governance of climate finance. This article argues
that international financial markets are presently unlikely to be the vanguard
of change to a low carbon world. This is for primarily two reasons. First, the
shift to a business case approach to SRI has blunted its pretences to be a
vehicle for radical reform. Secondly, although SRI arose to provide a form of
surrogate market regulation, compensating for the lacunae and weaknesses of
official regulation, its dependence on the state to create legal standards con-
ducive to responsible conduct in the area of climate finance is increasingly
evident. While the article does not seek to explain in detail how SRI could
be legally reformed to enable the financial sector to play a more effective role
in responding to climate change-a topic of great length requiring a further
essay-it provides insights into future directions.
2 See S Meeker-Lowry, Economics as if the Earth Really Mattered: A Catalyst Guide to
Socially Conscious Investing (New Society Publishers, Gabriola Island, Canada, 1988); S Bruyn,
The Field of Social Investment (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987).
3 On recent changes to SRI, see C Krosinsky and N Robins (eds), Sustainable Investing: The
Art of Long Term Performance (Earthscan, London 2008).
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I1. CLIMATE CHANGE CONCERNS FOR THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
A. An Emerging Issue
Climate change will be the most complex and expensive environmental
problem humanity has ever had to address. According to the Stem Review
commissioned by the British Government, the cost of business-as-usual, of not
taking immediate action to mitigate climate change, will in years to come
likely amount to between 5 to 10 per cent of world gross domestic product
(GDP) each year, but only 1 to 2 per cent of GDP if we act now. 4 The Stem
report, however, sanguinely assumes that climate change can be managed
without any fundamental change to our economy, the market system, and the
concomitant priority given to economic growth. Other commentators such as
Monbiot, Flannery, and Homer-Dixon predict much severer challenges and
costs in kicking the carbon economy.5 Credible government policy measures
to reduce emissions rapidly have yet to be advanced, and the political will in
many countries to force change is muted.6
In the present era of finance capitalism-an economic system dominated
by the financial sector and involving the propagation of a complex system of
banking services, securities markets, and other financial instruments 7-the
finance sector will likely play a central role in climate policy. It can help to
price climate risks and facilitate investment in renewable energy and efficient
technologies.8 The investment community increasingly perceives some action
on climate change as in its self-interest, for it poses risks to the value of
their investment portfolios or their borrowers' solvency through tightening
regulations, impairment of physical assets, and reduced income.9 A report by
the International Finance Corporation assessed climate change as 'a parti-
cularly powerful catalyst' for the incorporation of environmental factors into
4 N Stem, Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (HM Treasury, 2007).
5 G Monbiot, Heat: How to Stop the Planet Burning (HarperCollins, London, 2005);
T Flannery, The Weather Makers (Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, 2006); T Homer-Dixon,
The Upside of Down: Catastrophe and Renewal and the Renewal of Civilisation (Alfred A Knopf,
New York, 2006).
6 F Yamin and J Depledge, The International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to Rules,
Institutions and Procedures (Cambridge University Press, 2005); M Peeters and K Deketelaere
(eds), EU Climate Change Policy: The Challenge of New Regulatory Initiatives (Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham, 2006), D Zillman et al (eds), Beyond the Carbon Economy (Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2008).
7 See G Edwards, The Evolution of Finance Capitalism (Longmans, Green, and Company,
1938); J Froud, A Leaver and K Williams 'New Actors in a Financialised Economy and the
Remaking of Capitalism' 12 New Political Economy 339 (2007).
8 S Labatt and R White, Carbon Finance: The Financial Implications of Climate Change
(John Wiley, 2007).
9 A Shell and M Krantz, 'Global Warming a Hot Spot for Investors' USA Today Online
(27 February 2007); J Leggett, 'Climate Change and the Banking Industry: A Question of Both
Risk and Opportunity' (1996) 179 Bankers Magazine 25.
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investment decision-making.' 0 Some analysts predict 'climate change due
diligence.., will soon become an indispensable facet of inquiry in any
transaction'. 11
Although the financial sector is publishing numerous studies that warn of
the impact of global warming on its self-interest,1 2 so far tangible changes in
investment practices are hard to discern. Financial markets continue to capi-
talize the fossil fuel industry heavily. The surging investment in Alberta's oil
sands is one of the most controversial examples. Even many so-called SRI
funds continue to hold stakes in GHG emitting firms. 13 The business case for
investment in fossil fuels often remains far more potent than the business case
for divestment. Most fundamentally, the turmoil that swept global financial
markets in late 2008 and early 2009 epitomized the deep structural failure of
the financial sector to manage risks and invest with a view to the long term.'
4
The speculative, myopic and avaricious culture embedded in this sector,
which precipitated the market turmoil, hardly provides the appropriate milieu
to nurture an environmentally responsible financial community that invests for
sustainable development.
Presently, the financial sector acts mainly as a transactional mechanism to
allocate capital for climate mitigation and adaptation efforts. In other words,
it is an intermediary, helping to facilitate investment in renewable energies,
Clean Development Mechanism projects, and carbon emission trading.
One such player, for instance, is the British-based Carbon Capital Markets,
which buys and sells carbon allowances for companies. 15 The financial sector
has also pioneered voluntary trading schemes, the most successful example
being the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX). Established in 2003, the CCX
is a GHG emission allowance trading hub for emission sources and offset
projects in the United States (US) and a growing number of other countries
including Canada, Brazil, and Mexico.' 6 The CCX members, who include
corporate behemoths such as Ford and IBM, make voluntary commitments to
reduce their GHG emissions in 2010 by 6 per cent below a baseline period of
10 International Finance Corporation (IFC), 'Who Cares Who Wins'. One Year On (IFC,
2005) 8.
1 J Smith, 'The Implications of the Kyoto Protocol and the Global Warming Debate for
Business Transactions' (2005) New York University Journal of Law and Business 511.
12 j Llewellyn, The Business of Climate Change: Challenges and Opportunities (Lehman
Brothers, New York, 2007); World Resources Institute (WRI) and Merrill Lynch, Energy Security
and Climate Change: Investing in the Clean Car Revolution (WRI and Merrill Lynch, 2005);
Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Allianz, Climate Change and the Financial Sector:
An Agenda for Action (WWF and Allianz, Gland, Switzerland, 2005).
N Lansbury, Socially Responsible Climate Change? Fossil Fuel Investments of the Socially
Responsible Investment Industry in Australia (Mineral Policy Institute, 2002) 30.4 On the crisis, see G Soros, The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: The Credit Crisis of
2008 and What It Means (Public Affairs, New York, 2008); R Shiller, The Subprime Solution:
How Today's Global Financial Crisis Happened, and What to Do About It (Princeton University
Press, Princeton, 2008). 15 See <http://www.carboncapitalmarkets.com>.
16 See <http://www.chicagoclimatex.com>.
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1998_2001.17 In the retail finance markets, catering mainly to individuals,
mutual funds are selling climate-friendly investment portfolios, and banks are
offering 'green' home loans that take into account the energy efficiency of
mortgaged properties.'8
In theory, however, the long-standing movement for SRI suggests that the
financial sector could play a more ambitious role on climate issues. It evolved
from church-based, single-issue activism, where ethical investors eschewed
ties to companies and activities deemed immoral, such as gambling, alcohol,
and vulgar entertainment. From the late 1960s, the SRI movement began to
embrace a wider agenda of concern for human rights, taking up cause against
the Vietnam War and, later, South Africa's apartheid regime. 19 Since the
1980s, and especially since the late 1990s, SRI has also championed en-
vironmental causes including climate change.20 The massive growth of inter-
national financial markets, fuelled in part by surging household wealth and the
participation of mass society in investment schemes such as pension plans and
mutual funds, has provided an opportunity for ordinary people to use their
investments to promote positive social and environmental changes including
stopping global warming.2 1 As it has matured, SRI has sought to influence
financial markets through several techniques, including ethical screens (ex-
cluding assets in problematic firms), 'best-in-class' portfolios (selecting
the firms that act the most responsibly relative to their peers), shareholder
advocacy (using shareholder rights to advocate change within companies)
and, in the banking sector, financing on preferential terms to socially or en-
vironmentally beneficial projects. Through such techniques and engagement
with a widening agenda of issues, SRI seeks improvements in corporate social
and environmental behaviour beyond the letter of the law. However, as this
article will discuss shortly, that potential has not yet been generally reached.
B. The Market and Legal Context of Climate Finance
The threat of climate change, which should raise profound questions about the
sustainability of our economic system, is hardly debated in the mainstream
financial community.2 2 Taylor and Brown contend that we need to debate the
17 Remarks, Richard Sandor. CEO, Chicago Climate Exchange (18 th Annual SRI in the
Rockies Conference, Santa Ana Pueblo, New Mexico, 3-6 November 2007).
18 United Nations Environment Program Finance Initiative (UNEPFI), Green Financial
Products and Services: Current Developments and Future Opportunities in North America
(UNEPFI, Geneva, 2007) 17-19.
19 R Sparkes, 'A Historical Perspective on the Growth of Socially Responsible Investment'
in Rory Sullivan and Craig Mackenzie (eds) Responsible Investment (Greenleaf Publishing,
Sheffield, 2006), 39.
20 See M Jeucken, Sustainable Finance and Banking: The Financial Sector and the Future of
the Planet (Earthscan, London, 2001); Labatt and White, above (n 1).
21 S Davis, J Lukomnik and D Pitt-Watson, The New Capitalists. How Citizen Investors are
Reshaping the Corporate Agenda (Harvard Business Press, Cambridge, 2006).
22 See the online climate ethics network at < http://www.climateethics.org >.
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ethical issues raised by climate change to reach an urgently needed inter-
national consensus for action.23 They also see ethical deliberation as crucial
to leading the world toward an equitable sharing of the burdens and benefits
of protecting the planet, as called for in the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC).2 4 Yet, for most investors, global warming
is (at most) mainly a matter of financial risk or investment opportunity.
With decision-making in financial institutions dominated by fund managers
and other investment professionals focused on the 'bottom line', any notion
that such institutions are a forum of enlightened ethical deliberation among
climate-conscious investors would be naive.
The legal system influences the construction of these risks and investment
opportunities. On the upside, the Kyoto Protocol's 'flexible' mechanisms
create several market opportunities for financiers. 25 They expand opportu-
nities for lending to companies acquiring emission abatement technologies.
Also, the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation sectors
provide opportunities for project finance. Further, carbon emission trading
creates a demand for brokerage services. Finally, climate risk assessment in
equity and debt financing provides additional work for financial analysts.
On the downside, polluting industries in the oil and gas, heavy manufac-
turing, and transport sectors should be competitively disadvantaged by climate
regulation, thereby hurting their investors.26 While such losses would concern
any rational investor, they would particularly concern institutional investors
having fiduciary duties to their fund beneficiaries to promote optimal financial
returns.2 7 A guide for British pension fund trustees suggests that:
Climate risk can have a real impact on portfolio holdings. There is a growing
case for trustees to attain some level of knowledge around these issues, and to
take steps to mitigate any negative consequences of not taking action.
23 D Brown, American Heat: Ethical Problems with the United States Responses to Global
Warming (Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, Massachusetts, 2002); P Taylor, An Ecological
Approach to International Law. Responding to Challenges of Climate Change (Routledge,
London and New York, 1998). 24 Article 3.1 (1992) 31 ILM 849.
25 j Janssen, 'Implementing the Kyoto Mechanisms: Potential Contributions by Banks and
Insurance Companies' (2000) 25 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 602; J Mandt, 'Managing
Risk in Kyoto Projects' (1999) 1(2) Environmental Finance 23; H Hugenschmidt and J Janssen,
'Kyoto Protocol: New Market Opportunities or New Risks?' (1999) 11 Swiss Derivatives
Review 22.
26 World Resources Institute (WRI), Changing Oil: Emerging Environmental Risks and
Shareholder Value in the Oil and Gas Industry (WRI, Washington DC, 2002).
27 Fiduciary duties arise where the exercise of some discretionary power in the interests of
another person gives rise to a relationship of trust. The fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence
require the trustee to manage assets wisely only on behalf the beneficiaries. On fiduciary duties
and SRI, see B J Richardson, 'Do the Fiduciary Duties of Pension Funds Hinder Socially
Responsible Investment?' (2007) 22(2) Banking and Finance Law Review 145. While fiduciary
duties are a concept of common law systems, functionally equivalent concepts exist in some
financial legislation in civil law jurisdictions.
Climate Finance and Its Governance 603
In line with these definitions of fiduciary responsibility, we suggest that it is
consistent with fiduciary responsibility to address climate change risk.28
Regulatory risk is thus one of the most material concerns to investors, as some
governments have begun to tighten controls on GHG emissions. The growing
reliance on market-based policy instruments, such as carbon taxes and sub-
sidies for clean energy investments, will affect the competitive advantage of
polluters.2 9 Several studies also forecast that participants in emission cap-and-
trade schemes will incur cash flow risks from the increased expenditure on
GHG reduction measures or the purchase of emission allowances.
30
This partiality to economic instruments reflects a broader evolution in
environmental law worldwide, which is moving away from bureaucratic,
command-and-control regulation toward 'reflexive' legal instruments per-
ceived as more congruent with the workings of the market.3' Thus, the United
Kingdom (UK), once a staunch opponent of carbon taxation, in 2001 intro-
duced a climate change levy on non-renewable energy consumed by industry
and public sector agencies. 32 The UK's Climate Change and Sustainable
Energy Act 2006, Canada's Clean Air and Climate Change Act 2007 and New
Zealand's Climate Change (Emissions Trading and Renewable Preference)
Act 2008, are among the new climate laws creating a framework for
further such initiatives. Even in the US, where federal policy was largely
indifferent to global warming until the election of President Barack Obama,
several states have acted unilaterally. 33 For instance, California's Global
Warming Solutions Act 2006 caps the state's GHG emissions at 1990 levels
by 2020, and mandates a cap-and-trade system to help achieve this goal.
Litigation risks may also concern some investors. Several lawsuits initiated
in North America against major GHG emitters may ignite fears of a litigation
onslaught reminiscent of the anti-tobacco campaign. 34 Big polluters could be
28 Mercer Investment Consulting (MIC), A Climate for Change: A Trustee's Guide to
Understanding and Addressing Climate Risk (MIC, Carbon Trust, London, 2005) 18-19.
29 R Stavins, 'Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can National Governments
Address a Global Problem?' (1997) University of Chicago Legal Forum 293.
30 UNEPFI Climate Change Working Group, CEO Briefing. Emissions Trading (UNEPFI,
Geneva, January 2004), 4; Standard and Poor's (S&P's), Emissions Trading: Carbon Will Become
a Taxing Issue for European Utilities (S&P's, New York, 2003).
3 1 D Driesen, 'Economic Instruments for Sustainable Development' in B J Richardson and S
Wood (eds), Environmental Law for Sustainability (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2006) 277. On
reflexive law, see G Teubner, L Farmer and D Murphy (eds), Environmental Law and Ecological
Responsibility: The Concept and Practice of Ecological Seif-Organisation (John Wiley and Sons,
Hoboken, 1994).
32 B J Richardson and K Chanwai, 'The UK's Climate Change Levy: Is It Working?'
(2003)15(1) Journal of Environmental Law 39.
33 C Carlarne, 'Climate Change Policies an Ocean Apart: EU and US Climate Change
Policies Compared' (2006) 14 Penn State Environmental Law Review 435.
34 K Healy and J Tapick, 'Climate Change: It's Not Just a Policy Issue for Corporate
Counsel-It's a Legal Problem' (2004) 29 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 89; J Gupta,
'Legal Steps Outside the Climate Convention: Litigation as a Tool to Address Climate Change'
(2007) 16 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 76.
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liable for damages associated with the physical effects of climate change, such
as flooding, severe storm damage or droughts. In 2004, eight US states and
New York City sued five of the country's largest power companies for
creating a public nuisance.35 In the 2006 case of Lockyer v General Motors,3 6
California commenced a similar tort action against six automobile manu-
facturers. While some legal commentators believe that 'the probability of
legal victories against global warming is low', 3 7 they also concede that such
litigation may generate substantial legal fees and costly delays to new pro-
jects. Climate litigation is emerging in other countries, including actions
against governments in Australia
39 and Canada. 40
Climate change also poses both physical risks and intangible reputational
risks to investments. Economic sectors dependent on stable climate con-
ditions, such as agriculture, forestry and tourism, face physical threats. 41 The
oil industry itself is vulnerable, as illustrated by how Hurricane Katrina in
2005 shut down many refineries in Louisiana. The real estate finance sector
is also exposed to damages from extreme weather events.4 z The insurance
industry, which covers many of these risks, is thus acutely exposed.43 High
profile companies that disregard climate change also face reputational risks.
Fossil fuel dependent corporations like ExxonMobil are often targets of con-
sumer boycotts and shareholder pressure. 44 Civil society groups increasingly
target financial institutions associated with such firms; a coalition of mostly
US environmental groups in 2006 started a campaign that demanded major
banks cease lending to coal power plants. 45 In December 2008, the Bank of
America agreed to one of their demands to stop financing environmentally
destructive open-cut coal mining.46
35 See eg State of Connecticut, et a! v American Electric Power Company, et al (2005) 406 F
Supp 2d. 265 (SDNY) (under appeal).
No 3:06. Civ 05755 (ND California, filed 20 September, 2006).
37 M Levinson, Liability for Climate Change (JPMorgan Chase, New York November 2006).
38 ibid 1.
39 Australian Conservation Foundation v. Minister for Planning, [2004] VCAT 2029, 23.
40 Friends of the Earth v The Governor in Council and the Minister of the Environment,
[2008] FC 1183.
41 See UBS, Climate Change: Beyond Whether (UBS, Zilrich, 2007).
42 ISIS Asset Management, A Benchmarking Study: Environmental Credit-Risk Factors in the
Pan European Banking Sector (ISIS Asset Management, 2002), 14.
43 M Northrop, 'Leading by Example: Profitable Corporate Strategies and Successful Public
Policies for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions' (2004) 14 Widener Law Journal 21, 32.
44 F Barringer, 'Environmental Groups Planning to Urge Boycott of ExxonMobil' New York
Times (12 July 2005) A14.
45 J Donnelly, 'Banks are Urged not to Finance Coal Power' Boston Globe Online (16 January
207 T Zeller, 'Bank of America to Stop Financing Mountaintop Mining' New York Times
(4 December 2008).
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Conversely, companies that pioneer low carbon and energy efficient tech-
nologies stand to gain financially.47 Many investors, at least before the global
financial crisis of late 2008, were favouring renewable energies, ethanol pro-
duction, environmentally efficient technologies, and carbon offset projects.
48
Citigroup's 2007 list of 'climatic consequences companies' identified 74
companies (across 21 industries) 'that seem well positioned to benefit from
these trends'. 4 9 The creation of the Photon Photovoltaic Stock Index, ABN
AMRO Biofuel Commodity Index, and the KLD Global Climate 100 Index,
among various examples, enable investors to buy into a portfolio of companies
in these sectors. The propagation of carbon emissions trading systems pro-
mises further lucrative spoils for financial brokers. The World Bank estimated
that the value of the global carbon market reached US$64 billion in 2007 (up
from US$31 billion in 2006), mostly associated with the European Union's
GHG trading scheme.
50
Yet, incongruously, the fossil fuel sector still thrives. The effusive rhetoric
in the financial industry about the threat of global warming does not reflect the
wider picture. The spree of investment in the world's new oil frontier,
Alberta's oil sands, is just one example. 51 A 2007 study by Ethical Funds of
the booming oil sands industry documented that only four of the 50 companies
assessed were cutting emissions.52 Only a handful were taking appropriate
measures, such as factoring carbon costs into capital allocation decisions and
conducting GHG emission inventories. And few had invested in renewable
energy production.
Clearly, so long as fossil fuels remain a relatively cheap alternative and
vested interests thwart change, SRI in the energy sector has constrained
prospects. Plausibly, new policy instruments are required to create a level
playing-field. A report by the World Wide Fund for Nature and the Allianz
Group in 2005 advised that 'banks and investors in particular need a clear
regulatory framework on climate policy which they can adapt and base their
investment and lending decisions'. 53 Yet, the SRI movement arose precisely
as an answer to the lacunae and weaknesses of governmental regulation. When
governments fail to act, as they did against South Africa's apartheid regime,
47 World Resources Institute (WRI) and the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible
Economies (CERES), Questions and Answers for Investors on Climate Risk (WRI, Washington
DC, 2004) 23.
48 D Berman, 'Hot for Green Investing' Financial Post (19 February 2007).
49 Citigroup, Climatic Consequences (Citigroup Research, New York 19 January 2007) 1.
50 K Capoor and P Ambrosi, State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2008 (World Bank,
2008) 59.
51 R Walker, Ethical Funds Company (presentation at the Canadian Responsible Investment
Conference, Montreal, 27-29 May 2007).
52 Ethical Funds Company (EFC), Head in the Sands? Climate Change Risks in Canada's Oil
and Gas Sector (EFC, Vancourer, 2007) 2-4.
53 World Wide Fund for Nature and Allianz, above (n 12) 9.
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ethical investors seek reform through market pressure. Can the same occur for
climate change?
Ill. SRI AS A MEANS OF CLIMATE GOVERNANCE?
A. SRI Governance on Climate Change
To what extent can SRI provide an effective means of governance, beyond
official regulation, to facilitate action on climate change? Although once led
by the churches and charitable foundations, could SRI become a means to
articulate the climate concerns of a wider community of interests in a mass
investor society?
The following discussion will examine several areas where the financial
sector has pushed for action. These are: climate-related financial risk man-
agement, corporate reporting on GHG emissions and other climate-relevant
information, and shareholder activism to exert change inside companies.
However, before canvassing action in these domains, it is necessary to situate
that analysis in the broader context of whether SRI can provide a surrogate
form of regulation on social and environmental issues generally.
For several reasons, it is doubtful that SRI presently can significantly im-
prove corporate behaviour on climate issues. First, the SRI movement has
increasingly disavowed ethical arguments in favour of a business case for
social investment. By tying social and environmental activism to furthering
the 'bottom line', SRI has diminished its pretences to stand for change; there
often remains a countervailing business case for financing socially irrespon-
sible activities, or social and environmental values often cannot be factored
into the cost-benefit calculations. Second, the niche SRI market hardly influ-
ences the financing costs of firms, and thereby cannot give climate-conscious
companies a significant market advantage over their polluting rivals. Third,
the SRI movement's own international codes of conduct, such as the UN
Principles for Responsible Investment, offer relatively facile and discretionary
standards that enable financial institutions merely to tinker with reform. The
following sections of this article examine these three issues.
B. The Triumph of Economic over Ethical Values
SRI was once more commonly known as 'ethical investment'. It referred to
investors who, for strictly ethical reasons, either sought to avoid profit from
'sinful' activities (a stance associated with deontological ethics) or who
wished to use their financial resources to leverage positive change in the world
(a teleological ethical position).5 4 Its apotheosis was the divestment movement,
54 N Carter and M Huby, 'Ecological Citizenship and Ethical Investment' (2005) 14
Environmental Politics 255; P Dembinski et al 'The Ethical Foundations of Responsible
Investment' (2003) 48 Journal of Business Ethics 203.
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led by religious investors, against the apartheid regime in South Africa during
the 1970s and 1980s.55 From about the late 1990s, SRI began to change its
motivations and practices, as mainstream institutional investors such as large
pension plans came under pressure to be more mindful of the social
and environmental impacts associated with their financing. This pressure
arose partly from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which started to
target not merely the front-line polluters, but also their financial backers.
56
The shift in SRI was also influenced by precedent reforms to public devel-
opment finance, such as the greening World Bank project financing during the
1980s. 7
Yet, the mainstream financial community is generally not comfortable with
SRI's traditional ethical agenda. 58 Primarily, it believes that SRI may hurt
financial returns, which could have adverse legal repercussions given that
institutional investors owe fiduciary duties to their beneficiaries. There is
some truth to this belief, although fiduciary duties give some latitude to invest
responsibly, particularly where fund members demand ethical choices.59
Regardless, financial institutions have marshalled other arguments to avoid
ethical investment. Investing on behalf of thousands or millions of investors,
financial institutions fear immersion in acrimonious and irresolvable debates.
about the correct ethical course. On the assumption that their fund members
hold diverse ethical views on social and environmental issues, they conclude
that it would be impossible to reach a consensus to guide investment policy.
60
Alternatively, the maximization of financial returns is considered by fund
managers as a clear and easily measurable benchmark to which they should be
held to account.
Another factor undoubtedly shaping this shift in SRI philosophy is the
'ecological modernization' discourse, which became prevalent in Western
environmental policy-making during the 1990s. It posits that economic de-
velopment can be reconciled with environmental protection through techno-
logical innovation, managerial know-how, and the entrepreneurial spirit.
6'
55 Sparkes, above (n 19) 39.
56 S Waygood, Capital Market Campaigning. The Impact of NGOs on Companies,
Shareholder Value and Reputational Risk (Risk Books, London, 2006).
57 The Bank had incurred trenchant criticism for facilitating environmental degradation
through project financing. 0 Perez 'The New Universe of Green Finance: From Self-Regulation
to Multi-Polar Governance' in 0 Dilling, M Herberg, and G Winter (eds) Responsible Business:
Self-Governance in Transnational Economic Transactions (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2007) 151,
153.
.5 B J Richardson, 'Putting Ethics into Environmental Law: Fiduciary Duties for Ethical
Investment' (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 243, 253.
59 As outlined in Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, A Legal Framework for the Integration of
Environmental, Social and Governance Issues into Institutional Investment (UNEPFI, Geneva
200 .
2 J Entine (ed), Pension Fund Politics. The Dangers of Social Investing (American Enterprise
Institute, 2005).
61 S Young, The Emergence of Ecological Modernisation: Integrating the Environment
and the Economy? (Routledge, New York, 2001); M Andersen and I Massa, 'Ecological
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It optimistically projects that what is good for the environment is also good for
business, based on the notion that cutting waste and using clean technologies
improves market competitiveness and profitability. 62 It thus discretely
reframes the ethical and political dilemmas of industrialization as mere tech-
nical and managerial challenges. Such thinking has spilled into the SRI dis-
course, where corporate environmental performance is likewise increasingly
evaluated in cost-benefit terms and improvements in such performance are
seen as strengthening rather than diminishing investment returns.
63
As a result of these beliefs and arguments, the SRI movement is now driven
primarily by a business case. Corporate environmental performance is no
longer commonly evaluated against uncompromising ethical standards such as
the value of maintaining the integrity of the global climate. Rather, environ-
mental problems such as rising sea level, increasing hurricanes, and other
climate impacts are conceptualized as challenges of financial risk manage-
ment. But only those risks that are deemed to be 'financially material'-ie
posing tangible risks to investment assets or lucrative investment opportu-
nities-receive attention. 64 For example, the International Investors Group on
Climate Change (IIGCC) proclaims its goal as to:
- Promote better understanding of the implications of climate change
amongst our members and other institutional investors.
- Encourage companies and markets in which IIGCC members invest to ad-
dress any material risks and opportunities to their businesses associated
with climate change and a shift to a lower carbon economy.
65
The SRI community downplays moral arguments. The United Nations
Environment Program's Finance Initiative (UNEPFI), which is an industry
partnership coordinated by the UN to promote SRI, explains in its report,
Show Me the Money, that: '[t]he first-and arguably for investors the
most important-reason to integrate [SRI] issues is, simply, to make more
money'.
66
Modemisation--Origins, Dilemmas and Future Directions' (2000) 2 Journal of Environmental
Policy and Planning 337.
62 E Cohen-Rosenthal and J Musnikow (eds), Eco-Industrial Strategies: Unleashing Synergy
between Economic Development and the Environment (Greenleaf Publishing, Sheffield, 2003).
63 See research on this relationship: M Orlitzky, F Schmidt and S Rynes, 'Corporate Social
and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis' (2003) 24 Organization Studies 403; M Yamashita,
S Sen and M Roberts, 'The Rewards for Environmental Conscientiousness in the US Capital
Markets' (1999) 12 Journal of Financial and Strategic Decisions 73; N Lorraine, D Collison and
D Power, 'An Analysis of the Stock Market Impact of Environmental Performance Information'
(2004) 28 Accounting Forum 7.
64 UNEPFI, The Materiality of Social, Environmental and Corporate Governance Issues in
Equity Pricing (UNEPFI, Geneva, 2004). 65 See <http://www.iigcc.org>.
UNEPFI, Show Me the Money: Linking Environmental, Social and Governance Issues to
Company Value (UNEPFI, Geneva, 2006), 4.
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These attitudes can be contrasted with the ethical investor's position on
climate change. The policy of the Interfaith Center for Corporate Respon-
sibility's (ICCR) Global Warming Working Group is to:
- Encourage companies to report on their global warming emissions 'foot-
prints', as well as disclose global warming related risks and opportunities to
shareholders; and
- In recognition of future limits on global warming pollutants, encourage
companies to behave proactively by reducing greenhouse gas emissions to
sustainable levels.
67
The ICCR, which coordinates SRI among religious investors, goes further
than the IIGCC by stressing the priority of reducing carbon emissions. Its aim
is to prevent or mitigate global warming for its own sake, rather than as a
concern just tied to shareholder value.
The notion that environmental care and business success can be compatible
is, of course, not inconceivable. The objection is that any such optimism can
be a pretext for the perpetuation of business-as-usual. A huge gap between
SRI based on the yardstick of financial materiality and an ecologically
sustainable economy persists. Investment analysts often perceive social or
environmental values as too nebulous for workable financial quantification.
68
Values such as biodiversity or climate integrity cannot be captured by con-
ventional financial accounting systems unless they give rise to specific ex-
penses and income attributable to an individual organization. 69 Further, a
countervailing business case for environmentally problematic activities often
exists. The continuing investment in Canada's oil sands is one controversial
example. 70 Without additional ethical motivations, financiers may lack the
incentive to take actions beyond those prescribed by a business case.
C. SRI's Stunted Market Influence
The SRI sector remains small and appears unable to influence significantly the
environmental behaviour of companies. SRI is essentially a boutique niche,
likely holding less than ten per cent of the capital markets of the major Western
economies. 71 Much of the industry-generated research appears to exaggerate
67 See <http://www.iccr.org/issues/globalwarm/goalsobjectives.php>.
68 S McGeachie, M Kiernan and E Kirzner, Finance and the Environment in North America:
The State of Play of the Integration of Environmental Issues into Financial Research (Canadian
Department of the Environment, Ottawa 2005) 57.
69 S Goodman and T Little, The Gap in GAAP: An Examination of Environmental Accounting
Loooholes (2003).
0 K Makin, 'High-stakes Battle Looms over Oil-Sands Pollution' Globe and Mail (15 August
2007) Al.
11 Social Investment Forum (SIF), 2007 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in
the United States (SIF, 2008); European Social Investment Forum (Eurosit), Socially Responsible
Investment among European Institutional Investors (Eurosif, Paris, 2006).
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the extent of the SRI market, because the peak SRI associations are reluctant
to define clearly what should qualify as 'socially responsible'. A fund for
example that merely screens against tobacco stocks, but otherwise holds a
conventional investment portfolio, is sometimes counted as SRI.72 Despite its
increasing pragmatic business stance, the SRI market remains small because
many mainstream financial institutions have yet to appreciate the business
risks of environmentally irresponsible behaviour, or they even see financial
advantages in funding such behaviour. Even if the SRI market were signifi-
cantly larger, it is doubtful whether that alone would commensurately boost its
influence without other reforms.
Advocates of SRI believe that it financially rewards ethical firms through
additional investment and punishes unethical ones by divestment. It thereby
should both enhance returns for social investors while give firms incentives to
improve their environmental and social behaviour. 73 Certainly, 'SRI is more
likely to be relevant whenever companies are heavily dependent on the stock
market as a financing instrument'. 74 Corporate financing data suggests that
most companies, especially mature firms, can self-finance their operations and
growth through surplus revenue. 75 Yet, even they do not remain entirely in-
sulated from the demands of investors. 76 A declining stock price can affect
a firm's market capitalization and thus its stock market listing. Further, the
remuneration of corporate management is often tied to stock options, giving
managers incentives to adopt measures to keep stock prices artificially high.
However, theories of corporate finance doubt that stock market trading can
achieve the effects predicted by proponents of SRI.77 Conventional finance
theory suggests that investors can trade any quantity of a firm's shares without
affecting its price. This is because in an efficient equity market where demand
for a company's stock is almost perfectly elastic, 78 the price of a stock simply
reflects the expected future cash flows, and all informed investors supposedly
72 Social Investment Forum (SIF), 2005 Report on Socially Responsible Investing Trends in
the United States: A 10-Year Review (SIF, Washington DC, 2006) 9.
73 P Camejo, The SRI Advantage: Why Socially Responsible Investing has Outperformed
Financially (New Society Publishers, Gabriola Island, 2002); R Sparkes and C Cowton, 'The
Maturing of Socially Responsible Investment: A Review of the Developing Link with Corporate
Social Responsibility' (2004) 52 Journal of Business Ethics 45.
74 A Beltratti, Socially Responsible Investment in General Equilibrium (UniversitA Bocconi,
Milan, 2003) 21.
75 J Corbett and T Jenkinson, 'The Financing of Industry, 1970-1989: An International
Comparison' (1996) 10 Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 71; but compare to A
Hackethal and R Schmidt, Financing Patterns: Measurement Concepts and Empirical Results,
Working Paper (University of Frankfurt, 2003).
76 M Jensen and K Murphy, 'CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You Pay, But How'
(1990) 68(3) Harvard Business Review 138.
77 J Langbein and R Posner, 'Social Investing and the Law of Trusts' (1980) 79 Michigan
Law Review 72 M Knoll, 'Ethical Screening in Modem Financial Markets: The Conflicting
Claims Underlying Socially Responsible Investment' (2002) 57 Business Lawyer 681.
78 C Loderer et al, 'The Price Elasticity of Demand for Common Stock' (1991) 46 Journal of
Finance 621.
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value the company's stock identically. 79 Any SRI-motivated divestment
should not per se change the expected cash flow from the targeted firm's
activities, and therefore its stock prices should not change.8 0 Of course,
the stock price should vary if potential traders believe pressure on the stock
reflects a downward or upward view of the company's underlying financial
prospects. Business case SRI that educates the market to the financial conse-
quences of firms' environmental behaviour may have such an effect. It is when
social investors view unethical behaviour differently from the market as a
whole that they may be marginalized. Other theoretical research, which
assumes that markets do not always behave according to textbook theory,
suggests that SRI can alter the cost of capital when the stock of a firm is risky,
unique, or the stock trades in small, restrictive markets. 8 1 Otherwise, some
theoretical models predict that social investors would need to hold at least
20 per cent of the market, but likely much more, to affect stock prices.
82
Actual evidence of SRI's influence generally supports the foregoing as-
sessments. The most comprehensive studied action is the South African boy-
cott, which appears to have had modest effect on the targeted companies.
83
The widespread divestment from the tobacco industry appears to have had
minimal impact on their stock prices. 84 Some research suggests a short-term
impact on the stock prices of companies tainted by an environmental scandal
or pollution fines, but this is because such news is perceived by the market to
have implications for the profitability of the affected firm.
85
79 G Arnold, Handbook of Corporate Finance (Financial Times and Prentice Hall, 2005)
314, 330.
80 W Davidson, D Worell and A El-Jelly, 'Influencing Managers to Change Unpopular
Corporate Behavior through Boycotts and Divestitures' (1995) 34 Business and Society 171.OP Rivoli, 'Making a Difference or Making a Statement? Finance Research and Socially
Responsible Investment' (2003) 13 Business Ethics Quarterly 271.
82 R Heinkel, A Kraus and J Zechner, 'The Effect of Green Investment on Corporate
Behavior' (2001)36 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 431; J Angel and P Rivoli,
'Does Ethical Investing Impose a Cost Upon the Firm? A Theoretical Perspective' (1997) 6(4)
Journal of Investing 57. This discussion, concerning equity investment, is not necessarily appli-
cable to bank lending. Banks can have relatively more influence over borrowers, especially small
enterprises with few financing options, and firms in large project financing deals seeking huge
loans: Jeucken, above; P Thompson, 'Bank Lending and the Environment: Policies and
Opportunities' (1998) 16(6) International Journal of Bank Marketing 243.
3 S Teoh, I Welch and P Wazzan, 'The Effect of Socially Activist Investment Policies on the
Financial Markets: Evidence from the South African Boycott' (1999) 72 Journal of Business 35;
but compare to R Kumar, W Lamb and R Wokutch, 'The End of South African Sanctions,
Institutional Ownership, and the Stock Price of Boycotted Firms' (2002) 41 Business and Society
133.
84 T Burroughes, 'Ethical Investors Losing Out as Tobacco Stocks Burn Up Britain's Equity
Markets' The Business (24 February 2007).
85 Lorraine, Collison and Power, above (n 63); D Cormier, M Magnan and B Morard
'The Impact of Corporate Pollution on Market Valuation: Some Empirical Evidence' (1993) 8
Ecological Economics 135; J Hamilton 'Pollution as News: Media and Stock Market Reactions to
the Toxics Release Inventory Data' (1995) 28 Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 98.
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SRI may also achieve some influence when undertaken through shareholder
advocacy and engagement with corporate management. Institutional investors
have traditionally been passive investors, lacking incentives to monitor com-
panies because of the costs involved and difficulties of coordinating action.
86
While some commentators believe they increasingly are more active,
87
the impact of such activism appears episodic and fleeting. SRI-inspired
shareholder resolutions rarely gamer more than ten per cent of the votes at a
meeting. 88 However, sometimes defeated shareholder resolutions may induce
management to work cooperatively, as they may interpret even modest dissent
as reflective of broader unease about company policies.
In sum, SRI has yet to transform financial markets and the companies they
finance. It has generally not yet had the strength of a surrogate regulator, able
to influence companies through reward or divestment to improve their be-
haviour. Indeed, SRI appears to rely on the underlying system of environ-
mental regulation to alter the financial advantages between polluters and
socially responsible firms. Regulatory and public policy reforms are therefore
probably essential if SRI is to be a means of advancing action on climate
change and other environmental problems. But rather than continue to target
only the 'front-line' companies, legal reform should also directly challenge
the behaviour of their financial sponsors. Such reforms could include re-
defining the fiduciary duties of investment institutions to strengthen the
mandate for SRI, improving the reporting by companies and their financiers
on their social and environmental performance, integrating social accounting
standards, and in some cases imposing environmental liability on financial
sponsors. 89 The SRI movement, however, has not greatly clamoured for such
reforms; it has preferred to draft its own codes of conduct for financiers to
adopt voluntarily, as the following section canvasses.
D. SRI Codes and Standards
1. Codes related to climate finance
The SRI sector is more than a just a certain style of financing. It has also
fashioned its own codes of conduct to help coordinate, standardize, and
facilitate responsible financing. These voluntary mechanisms, developed by
market and civil society institutions, have proliferated since 2000.90
This web of SRI governance relies on a diversity of methods, structures
and objectives, broadly classifiable into four types (although any individual
86 J Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) 168-69.
87 Davis, Lukomnik and Pitt-Watson, above (n 21) 15-16.
88 ibid 16-18.
89 B J Richardson, 'Diffusing Environmental Regulation through the Financial Services
Sector: Reforms in the EU and other Jurisdictions' (2003) 10(3) Maastricht Journal of European
and Comparative Law 1. 90 Perez, above (n 57).
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instrument may contain several of these features). First, there are normative
frameworks that set substantive performance standards for social and environ-
mental conduct. An example is the Collevecchio Declaration on Financial
Institutions. 91 Process standards, enabling the assessment, verification, and
communication of performance, constitute another form of governance.
They include the Equator Principles92 and the Global Reporting Initiative.
93
Third, management systems, such as the International Organization for
Standardization's ISO 14001 regime, create a structure to guide the manage-
ment of environmental and social activities and impacts. 94 Finally, compar-
ative evaluation mechanisms have been developed by the SRI industry to
evaluate and rank corporate performance for the purpose of selecting invest-
ments. These rating mechanisms include SRI stock market indexes such as the
Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes9 5 and the FTSE4 Good Index Series.
96
In these respects, the SRI industry mirrors the general drift to corporate
self-regulation in most Western economies. The trend has been extensively
analysed in the literature, which need not be repeated here. 97 Many com-
mentators and policy-makers are sceptical of corporate intentions, and doubt
that voluntary mechanisms provide a credible means of environmental
regulation. 98 Many of the SRI codes are too ambiguous and open-ended
in their expectations. The most demanding standards are contained in the
Collevecchio Declaration, a product of civil society institutions, which has
been largely ignored by mainstream investors. They favour more discretionary
and procedural-based standards, dealing with disclosure, reporting, and
auditing of investment activities. While some reflexive law scholarship is
confident that such measures can induce positive changes in affected organ-
izations' behaviour,99 by encouraging reflection and learning, the empirical




94 See generally Ruth Hillary (ed), ISO 14001: Case Studies and Practical Experience
(Greenleaf Publishing, Sheffield, 2000).
95 See <http://www.sustainability-index.com>.
96 See <http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good IndexSeries/index.jsp>.
97 See eg S Wood, 'Voluntary Environmental Cod-es and Sustainability' in B J Richardson
and S Wood (eds), Environmental Law for Sustainability (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2006) 229;
R Gibson (ed), Voluntary Initiatives: The New Politics of Corporate Greening (Broadview Press,
Peterborough, 1999); J Moon, 'The Firm as Citizen? Social Responsibility of Business in
Australia' (1995) 30(1) Australian Journal of Political Science I.
98 eg Ian Maitland, 'The Limits of Business Self-Regulation' (1995) California Management
Review (1995) 27(3) 132; Wood, above (n 97).
99 See Teubner, Farmer and Murphy, above (n 31).
1OO eg M Vidovic and N Khanna, 'Can Voluntary Pollution Prevention Programs Fulfill Their
Promises? Further Evidence from the EPA's 33/50 Program' (2007) 53 Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 180; US Government Accountability Office (GAO), Climate
Change: EPA and DOE Should Do More to Encourage Progress Under Two Voluntary Programs
(GAO, Washington DC, 2006); C Woolfson and M Beck (eds), Corporate Social Responsibility
Failures in the Oil Industry (Baywood Publishing, Amityville, 2005).
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credible sanctions or enforcement mechanisms, so that compliance has come
to depend on peer pressure, the discipline of the market, or sustained NGO
demands. The corporate stone-walling of the draft UN Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations illustrates corporate attitudes
to regulatory standards with teeth.' 0 1
A few voluntary codes have been drafted to address climate finance
specifically. The Climate Principles is one example of a voluntary initiative
that purports to provide a 'common global standard of best practice not only to
assist the finance sector in managing its own climate impact but also to assist
the sector in supporting its clients and stakeholders in managing their own
impacts'. 10 2 The Principles were finalized in December 2008 by the Climate
Group, an NGO, in dialogue with some 20 financial institutions. The Climate
Principles address most aspects of the financial industry including investment
management, retail banking, insurance, and project finance. For example, in
relation to the financing of projects that involve the release of at least 100,000
tons of carbon dioxide equivalent annually, signatories to the Principles are
expected to request that their clients 'quantify and disclose' GHG emissions
associated with the project, to 'monitor and report GHG emissions annually in
accordance with internationally-recognized methodologies' and to 'evaluate
technically and financially feasible options to reduce or offset project-related
GHG emissions'. 103 The Climate Principles build on the 'Carbon Principles',
adopted in February 2008 by six US banks, 'to provide a consistent approach
for banks and their US power clients to evaluate and address carbon risks in
the financing of electric power projects'. 10 4 Like the Climate Principles, the
Carbon Principles emphasize procedural standards rather than absolute pro-
hibitions on the financing of fossil fuel-intensive developments or companies,
thereby providing latitude for business-as-usual. But far more influential and
widely endorsed than either of these two codes is the UNPRI, as the next
section explains.
2. UN Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI)
Designed primarily for institutional investors, the UNPRI is a voluntary code
of conduct that combines process and substantive performance standards. It
was developed under the auspices of UNEPFI, which established a working
group comprised of invited investment professionals, who were supported by
101 UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Sub-Commission on Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (UN ECOSOC, New York, 2003).
102 Climate Group: <http://www.theclimategroup.org/about/corporate-leadership/climate_
principles >.
"03 Article 2.7, at <http://www.theclimategroup.org/assets/resources/TCP_English.pdf>.
104 See <http://carbonprinciples.org/>.
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a multi-stakeholder collection of some 70 experts including representatives
from some major environmental NGOs.
The UNPRI is a succinct code of six core principles, each of which is
illustrated by several 'possible actions'. The principles state:
1. We will incorporate environmental, social and corporate governance
(ESG) issues into investment analysis and decision-making processes.
2. We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership
policies and practices.
3. We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which
we invest.
4. We will promote acceptance and implementation of the Principles within
the investment industry.
5. We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the
Principles.
6. We will each report on our activities and progress towards implementing
the Principles. 105
The accompanying list of possible actions provides a best practice guide.
Concerning the second principle, for instance, the suggested actions to achieve
active ownership include to 'exercise voting rights', 'develop an engagement
capability', and 'file shareholder resolutions consistent with long-term ESG
considerations'. Through such actions, the UNPRI secretariat sees several
benefits:
Implementing the Principles will lead to a more complete understanding of a
range of material issues, and this should ultimately result in increased returns and
lower risk. There is increasing evidence that ESG issues can be material to
performance of portfolios, particularly over the long term.
PRI signatories are also part of a network, with opportunities to pool resources
and influence, lowering the costs and increasing the effectiveness of research and
active ownership practices. The Initiative also supports investors in working
together to address systemic problems that, if remedied, may then lead to more
stable, accountable and profitable market conditions overall.
0 6
In addition to the narrowness of this business case orientation, the UNPRI
has some specific limitations. Among the list of conceivable actions for the
first principle, there is no stated expectation that investors actually incorporate
social or environmental factors into their ultimate portfolio choices. The
Principles do not require a signatory to demonstrate any particular perform-
ance standards with regard to human rights or environmental protection. The
second principle on active ownership focuses on participation in investee
companies, while curiously ignoring the equally pressing need to democratise
105 See <http://www.unpri.org/principles>.
106 UNPRI, 'Frequently Asked Questions': <http://www.unpri.org/faqs>.
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decision-making within financial institutions. Nor do the UNPRI insist on
any independent audit or verification mechanism to assess the quality of sig-
natories' implementation. To reassure investors, the UNPRI explains:
There are no legal or regulatory sanctions associated with the Principles. They
are designed to be voluntary and aspirational. There may be reputational risks
associated with signing up and then failing to take any action at all, but the
commitments are, for most signatories, a work in progress and a direction to head
in rather than a prescriptive checklist with which to comply.,
0 7
Such an insouciant attitude contrasts with the rigour of the Collevecchio
Declaration, developed by NGOs. Its ambitious 'commitment to sustain-
ability' principle obliges investors to:
expand their missions from ones that prioritize profit maximization to a vision of
social and environmental sustainability. A commitment to sustainability would
require financial institutions to fully integrate the consideration of ecological
limits, social equity and economic justice into corporate strategies and core
business areas (including credit, investing, underwriting, advising), to put sus-
tainability objectives on an equal footing to shareholder maximization and client
satisfaction, and to actively strive to finance transactions that promote sustain-
ability.
Such a standard, if adopted widely by financial institutions, would provide a
strong platform to address climate change as a valuable goal in its own right.
Nonetheless, accommodating rather than radically challenging the financial
sector, the UNPRI will likely remain one of the main benchmarks for SRI. As
of June 2008, over 350 institutions had signed the Principles, holding more
than US$14 trillion in assets. 108 The UNPRI has been generally well received
by the finance sector, it being attracted to the Principles for the eminence of
their sponsorship by the UN while still maintaining considerable latitude in
the open-ended standards.
While the UNPRI does not explicitly refer to climate change, conceivably
it is the type of environmental issue that signatories to the Principles should
address. Unlike the UNEPFI, the UNPRI secretariat has not established any
dedicated working groups or major projects that focus on global warming and
SRI. 10 9 Some individual signatories mention how they use the UNPRI to in-
form their policies. AMP Capital states that it 'is progressively applying the
UNPRI to our investment activities across all asset classes ... on the potential
risks and issues around policy response to climate change'. 10 However, most
financiers ostensibly interested in SRI typically are signatories to several
107 ibid.
108 UNPRI Secretariat, PR1 Report on Progress 2008 (UNPRI, London, June 2008), 2.
109 UNEPFI has a Climate Change Work Stream: <http:www.unepfi.org/work-streams/
climate change/index.html >.
"0 AMP Capital, 'AMP Capital a signatory to the United Nations Principles of Responsible
Investment', <http://www.ampcapital.com.au/corporatecentre/unpri.asp>.
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codes and regimes, and do not purport to attribute actions on climate change or
other environmental issues to any one standard such as the UNPRI.
The following section reviews some of the specific ways that institutional
investors are addressing climate change issues pursuant to the UNPRI and
other evolving SRI standards.
IV. INVESTOR RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE
A. Risk Management
Improved understanding and management of the financial risks posed by
climate change has been the primary concern of the SRI community. With
their diverse portfolios and long-term financial liabilities, all institutional in-
vestors have good reasons to be attentive to climate-related risks. They have
established some collaborative forums to share ideas and best practices. One
example is the Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR), which was created
out of the UN-convened Investor Summit on Climate Risk in 2003.111 As of
January 2009, the INCR claimed a membership of approximately 75 insti-
tutional investors. It organizes conferences to educate fund managers about
climate risks, and publishes various reports. Another association performing a
similar collaborative role is the UK-based Institutional Investors' Group on
Climate Change (IIGCC), with some 50 members as of January 2009.' 12 The
UN is also partnering with institutional investors through the UNEPFI's
Climate Change Work Stream. It seeks to raise awareness of climate issues in
the financial sector and has been a rare advocate for public policy reform."13
Some individual financial institutions are also voicing concerns and taking
action. In 2001, the UK's Universities Superannuation Scheme published a
working paper examining climate change as a financial risk." 4 In the US,
public sector pension funds have also taken the lead in identifying climate
change as a long-term risk to portfolio companies. 1 5 The 'Green Wave
Initiative', launched in 2004 by the California State Treasurer with the state's
two largest public sector funds," 6 commits the participants to invest millions
in climate-friendly technologies and clean energy companies." 17
For banks, climate change can pose project specific risks, such as to in-
vestments located in low-lying coastal areas or projects dependent on
111 See <http://www.incr.com>.
112 See <http://www.iigcc.org>. 113 See <http://unepfi.net/cc>.
114 M Mansley and A Dlugoleck, Climate Change-A Risk Management Challenge for
Institutional Investors (Universities Superannuation Scheme, London 2001).
15 C Williams and J Conley, 'An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American
Shareholder Value Construct' (2005) 18 Comell International Law Journal 555.
116 California Public Employees' Retirement System (CaIPERS) and the California State
Teachers' Retirement System (CalSTRS).
117 j Sandred, 'Catching the Green Wave: Investment in Environmental Technology Gaining
Momentum', San Francisco Chronicle (31 May 2004).
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predictable weather patterns. 118 As Philpott explains, 'there is not, at present,
a standard approach within the international banking industry for transparency
and accountability for the global warming performance of project finance'." 
9
A few banks are committing themselves to absolute reductions in GHG
emissions in their lending portfolio. In its energy-lending portfolio, the Bank
of America promises to reduce the emissions of projects it finances by
seven per cent. 2 The HSBC unveiled its carbon management plan in
December 2004, committing the bank to 'carbon neutrality' from its oper-
ations globally. 121 Both the Bank of America and HSBC are signatories of the
Carbon Principles and Climate Principles respectively.
Climate risks have become an even greater concern in the property and
casualty insurance industry. 122 Costly weather catastrophes that spiked during
the 1980s and 1990s-seen as a harbinger of global warming-pushed the
insurance industry into the climate policy debates. 123 Some insurance com-
panies responded by withdrawing coverage for certain risks, hiking premiums,
imposing greater deductibles, and adopting physical risk management and
other protective measures as a precondition to insurance.124 Some also exerted
pressure on policy-makers, lobbying for regulatory action, and collaborating
with public authorities on research and preventative measures. 125 Yet,
curiously, some insurance companies appear to have often disregarded the
climate risks in their own investment portfolios. 
126
Insurance cannot eliminate the risks of global warming occurring, although
it may indirectly help to reduce the ensuing damage by encouraging adoption
of mitigation measures, and by channelling compensation to victims of the
effects of climate change. Insurers have also pioneered new catastrophe risk
mechanisms, such as catastrophe future and weather derivatives, to tap into
118 J Philpott, 'Keeping it Private, Going Public: Assessing, Monitoring, and Disclosing the
Global Warming Performance of Project Finance' (2005) 5 Sustainable Development Law and
Policy 45. 19 ibid 47.
12o Bank of America, 'Bank of America Climate Change Position', at <http://www.
bankofamerica.com/environent >. Yet, as recently as June 2007, the Bank of America was the
target of protest actions for its continuing investments in the coal industry: 'Activists Drape 50ft
Banner Across From B of A Headquarters, Call on Bank to Stop Funding Dirty Coal' Asheville
Indymedia (23 October 2007).
121 'HSBC Earns Credit for Being First 'Carbon Neutral' Bank' GreenBiz.com (7 December
2004).
122 Innovest, Climate Change and the Financial Services Industry. Module ]-Threats and
Opportunities (UNEPFI Climate Change Working Group, Geneva, 2002) 16-17.23 C Flavin, 'Storm Warnings: Climate Change Hits the Insurance Industry' (1994) 7 World
Watch 10.
124 A Dlugolecki, 'An Insurer's Perspective' in Jeremy Leggett (ed) Climate Change and the
Financial Sector (Gerling Akademie-Verlag, Munich, 1996) 64, 75.
125 D Kirk, 'Insurers Voice Need to Combat Climate Risks' (1999) 33(45) Business Insurance
45; F Nutter, 'Global Climate Change: Why US Insurers Care' (1999) 42(1) Climatic Change 45.
126 FM Research, Capital Punishment: UK Insurance Companies and the Global Environment
(Friends of the Earth, London, 2000) 47-49.
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the deep resources of the capital markets. 127 The market for weather deriva-
tives contracts allows climate-related risks to be hedged. 128 To illustrate, if a
disaster occurs, the insurer that issued the catastrophe bond would pay claims
with the funds that would otherwise have gone to the bondholders. If good
weather prevails during the bond period (typically a year), investors gain by
the return of their principal plus interest payments.129
B. Disclosing Investment-Related Climate Impacts
Socially responsible investors need to know about companies' GHG emis-
sions if they are to construct environmentally responsible and less risky
investment portfolios. The lack of well established legal obligations to report
such information, coupled with the lack of comprehensive, standardised
methods for reporting such emissions on a voluntary basis, has hindered
SRI on climate issues.' 30 Further, companies facing material climate-related
financial risks are disinclined to disclose fully such information.131 In some
jurisdictions such as Canada, the UK, and the US, general corporate financial
reporting laws require companies to disclose any costs or benefits associated
with their environmental performance that may materially affect the firm's
financial health. 132 Generally poor implementation of such standards has en-
couraged the SRI industry to develop its own reporting protocols.
In addition to petitioning securities regulators to improve their enforcement
of disclosure rules,1 3 3 financial institutions have designed their own infor-
mational tools to enable action on global warming. Among these tools are the
Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and the Greenhouse Gas Protocol Initiative
(GHGPI). They generate data that help facilitate dialogue between financial
institutions and firms on climate change.
127 See further D Jaffee and T Russell, 'Catastrophe Insurance: Capital Markets and
Uninsurable Risks' (1997) 64 Journal of Risk and Insurance 205; S D'Arcy and V France
'Catastrophe Futures: A Better Hedge for Insurers' (1992) 59 Journal of Risk and Insurance 575.
128 See G Chichilnisky and G Heal, 'Managing Unknown Risks' (1998) 24(4) Journal of
Portfolio Management 85.
129 See J Tynes, 'Catastrophe Risk Securitization' (2000) 19(1) Journal of Insurance
Regulation 3.
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) and International Emissions Trading Association (IETA),
Uncertainty in Accounting for the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and Certified Emission
Reductions (PWC and IETA, London, 2007) 15-16.
131 Economist Intelligence Unit, A Change in the Climate. Is Business Going Green?
(UK Trade and Investment, London, 2007) 8.
132 eg Canadian Institute of Chartered Accounts (CICA), MD&A Disclosure about the
Financial Impact of Climate Change and Other Environmental Issues. Discussion Brief (CICA,
2005); J Smith, 'The Implications of the Kyoto Protocol and the Global Warming Debate for
Business Transactions' (2005) 1 New York University Journal of Law and Business 511, 529;
M Chan-Fishel, Fifth Survey of Climate Change Disclosure in SEC Filings of Automobile,
Insurance, Oil and Gas, Petrochemical, and Utilities Companies (Friends of the Earth, San
Francisco, 2006).
133 S Mufson, 'SEC Pressed to Require Climate-Risk Disclosures' Washington Post
(18 September 2007) DOI.
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The CDP is a mechanism that coordinates requests from institutional
investors for information on companies' climate change-related activities.'
34
Begun in December 2000, the CDP allows investors to collectively endorse
a single global request for disclosure of information regarding companies'
GHG emissions, vulnerability to climate change impacts, emission trading
activities and their policies on climate change. These requests are made
annually to an ever-larger pool of major companies. By mid-2008, over 3,000
corporations were asked to report to the CDP, on behalf of nearly 400
investment institutions.1 35 About half responded. Since 2007, the CDP has
also asked for information about companies' emissions connected to their
supply chains, thereby helping to provide a more comprehensive picture of
GHG pollution.' 36 The CDP is now probably the largest registry of corporate
GHG emissions data in the world, for the benefit of hundreds of climate-
conscious institutional investors.
Whereas the CDP focuses on reporting data, the GHGPI aims to improve
the underlying methods of accounting behind such data. 137 Developed by
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development and the World
Resources Institute, the GHGPI consists of two modules. The Corporate
Accounting and Reporting Standard Module can assist companies and other
organisations to identify, calculate, and report GHG emissions. This module is
limited in that it does not adequately address the position of financial insti-
tutions, which do not have to account for the GHG emissions of companies
they fund (the latter are deemed the responsible entities). The second module
is the Project Accounting Protocol and Guidelines, designed for calculating
reductions in GHG emissions from specific projects and land use changes.
The GHGPI provides the accounting framework for the European Union's
Emissions Trading Scheme and other initiatives.
Both the CDP and GHGPI inform some other disclosure regimes. One is the
World Economic Forum's Global Greenhouse Gas Register (GHG Register),
established in 2004, to provide a global inventory of corporate emissions in-
ventories and reduction targets, based on the GHGPI. 138 The Global Reporting
Initiative, to some the gold standard for sustainability reporting, contains
directions on reporting relevant information regarding climate change. 1'3 9 The
Global Reporting Initiative's G3 Reporting Framework of October 2006
introduced a specific reporting indicator on the 'financial implications due to
climate change'. 140 Another initiative also informed by the GHGPI is the ISO
134 See <http://www.cdproject.net>.
135 See <http://www.cdproject.net/faqs.asp>.
136 Remarks by Paul Dickinson, Chief Executive Officer, CDP (UNEPFI Global Roundtable,
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14064 standard, released in March 2006. It aims to promote consistency,
transparency, and credibility in GHG emission quantification, reporting, and
verification, to thereby facilitate trade in GHG allowances and credits. 14 1
The ISO 14064 is complemented by ISO 14065, with requirements to accredit
or recognise bodies that undertake GHG validation or verification.42
Overall, these reporting mechanisms are perhaps the most promising
achievement of the financial sector on climate change issues. They provide a
rare example of where SRI can provide leadership on governance of climate
issues, setting an example for governments to follow. These successes prob-
ably owe to the fact that they do not actually require any changes in the
behaviour of financial institutions themselves-only of the companies they
fund.
C. Shareholder Activism
Another way that the financial sector may voice its concerns about climate
change is through shareholder activism. Financiers sometimes use shareholder
resolutions and dialogue to spur corporate management to meet their demands
on matters ranging from corporate governance to environmental practices.
Shareholder resolutions on climate issues typically ask management to report
on climate change risks that may affect the firm, rather than ask the firm to
adopt specific actions to mitigate their emissions, which, in some jurisdictions,
could be construed as an impermissible attempt to dictate managerial action.
While many corporations strenuously resist such 'interferences', some react
positively; they may agree to disclose their GHG emissions, to set emission
reduction goals, make energy efficiency investments, and integrate climate
risks into core business plans.
Nonetheless, shareholder resolutions on climate issues are rare and have
garnered little open support until recently. 143 Most such resolutions have been
filed in the US. A study of such proposals filed in 81 US companies during the
period 2000-2003 found that they only attracted on average support from
13 per cent of the shareholders.144 A survey by the Social Investment Forum
documented 25 shareholder resolutions on climate issues in 2003, rising to
141 It comprises three specific standards: ISO 14064-1: 2006, Greenhouse Gases-Part 1:
Specification with Guidance at the Organization Level for the Quantification and Reporting of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Removals; ISO 14064-2: 2006, Greenhouse Gases-Part 2:
Specification with Guidance at the Project Level for the Quantification, Monitoring And
Reporting of Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions and Removal Enhancements; ISO 14064-3:
2006, Greenhouse Gases-Part 3: Specification with Guidance for the Validation and Verification
of Greenhouse Gas Assertions.
142 ISO 14065: 2007, Greenhouse Gases-Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Validation and
Verification Bodies for Use in Accreditation or Other Forms of Recognition.
143 R Monks et al, 'Shareholder Activism on Environmental Issues: A Study of Proposals at
Large US Corporations (2000-2003)' (2004) 28 Natural Resources Forum 317, 319.
ibid 321.
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35 in 2005. The resolutions attracted an average of 16.7 per cent support in
2003, which declined to 10.8 per cent in 2005.145 One resolution asking the
ExxonMobil board of directors comprehensively to review how it would meet
GHG reduction targets in countries subject to the Kyoto Protocol received a
relatively high 28.3 per cent of the votes. 146 The 2008 proxy season in the US
saw a further spike in climate change-related resolutions, with 57 proposals
filed in American companies. 14 7 Shareholder resolutions that went to a vote
garnered a record high average voting support of 21.6 per cent, including
nearly 40 per cent backing for a resolution filed with Allegheny Energy,
the most ever for a global warming resolution in the US.148 However, such
resolutions remain rare in other jurisdictions, such as in the UK where
investors often prefer informal dialogue with corporate management. 149
Shareholder activism on climate change is usually sponsored by a limited
range of financial institutions. Public sector pension funds and faith-based
investors are the most climate-conscious shareholders. 1 5 0 Mutual funds have
been the most taciturn, although some commentators believe this will change
in the US and Canada in the wake of securities regulation reforms in 2003 and
2005 respectively requiring such funds in these jurisdictions to disclose their
proxy voting records. 15 Until now, the US mutual fund industry has tended
to routinely side with management on shareholder resolutions. One report
analyzed how the US's 100 largest mutual funds voted their shareholder
proxies on climate change resolutions filed in 2005.152 During that period,
only three investment companies (Columbia, Franklin Templeton, and
Neuberger Berman) had proxy voting guidelines allowing fund manages to
support proposals for corporate disclosure on environmental issues such as
climate change. Moreover, of votes actually cast, no mutual funds surveyed
supported any climate change proposals filed. For example, Excelsior Funds'
Voting Guidelines on Social and Environmental Issues (adopted in October
2004) state:
We do not believe that social and political restrictions should be placed
on a company's business operations, unless determined as appropriate by
145 Social Investment Forum (SIF), 2005 Socially Responsible Investing Trends in the United
States: JO-Year Review (SIF, Washington DC, 2006) 19 (in each year, some of the resolutions
were withdrawn before the vote, usually because management agreed in advance to respond
positively to the requests made). 146 ibid 10.
147 Investor Network on Climate Risk, 'Investors Achieve Major Company Commitments on
Climate Change' (20 August 2008), at <http://www.incr.com/Page.aspx?pid=227 >.
148 ibid.
149 As evident in the work of the UK-based IIGCC, at < http://www.iigcc.org >.
150 SIF, above (n 145) 22.
1 C Williams and J Conley 'Corporate Social Responsibility in the International Context:
Is there an Emerging Fiduciary Duty to Consider Human Rights?' (2005) 74 University of
Cincinnati Law Review 75, 96.
152 D Cogan, Unexamined Risk: How Mutual Funds Vote on Climate Change Shareholder
Risk (CERES, Boston, 2006) 299.
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management. While from an investment perspective we may consider how a
company's social and political practices may affect present and prospective va-
luations and returns, we believe that proposals which prohibit companies from
lines of business for social or political reasons are often motivated by narrow
interest groups and not in the best interest of the broad base of shareholders of a
company. We believe that management is in the best position to determine these
fundamental business questions. We will typically vote against such propo-
sals.
153
While the proxy voting record reforms in the US now require mutual funds
to disclose publicly their voting policies and actual voting records, some
preliminary research suggests it has not generated significant changes in the
industry. 154
The US Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has arbitrated over many
shareholder resolutions on climate change disputed by the targeted com-
panies.155 The SEC has tended to rule against resolutions if they raise 'ordinary
business' issues deemed a prerogative of management.156 The SEC, however,
has sometimes appeared to view such issues differently. In April 2003, the
SEC allowed Xcel Energy to exclude a shareholder request for an evaluation
of climate change risks to the market competitiveness of the company. 157 Yet,
in March 2005, the SEC allowed a shareholder demand on ExxonMobil to
'undertake a comprehensive review and publish a report on how it will meet
the greenhouse gas reduction targets of those countries in which it operates
which have adopted the Kyoto Protocol'.158 The SEC rejected the claim of
ExxonMobil's management that the shareholders' request amounted to an
attempt to micro-manage the business.
To date, although shareholder resolutions on climate change issues are
relatively scarce compared to traditional subjects of shareholder proposals
(such as executive pay), climate change as a subject garners more shareholder
proposals than virtually any other environmental cause on the SRI agenda.'
59
Further, targeted companies may concede to shareholder demands even if a
proposal is defeated in a vote. Thus, Ford Motor Company agreed to im-
plement a defeated resolution that asked it to report on the business impli-
cations of reducing GHG emissions from its vehicles and manufacturing
153 Cited in Cogan, ibid 28.
154 M Cremers and R Romano, 'Institutional Investors and Proxy Voting: The Impact of the
2003 Mutual Fund Voting Disclosure Regulation', ECGI-Law Working Paper No 083/2007
(Social Science Research Network, 24 April 2007) 2-3.
155 For a more detailed discussion, see S Choi, 'It's Getting Hot in Here: The SEC's
Regulation of Climate Change Shareholder Proposals Under the Ordinary Business Exception'
(2006) 17 Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum 165.
156 ibid 178-79.
157 Xcel Energy, 'SEC No-Action Letter, 2003', Lexis 500 (April 1, 2003) 1.
15s ExxonMobil Corporation, 'SEC No-Action Letter, 2005', Lexis 466 (March 23, 2005) 1.
159 SIF, above (n 145) 19 (only shareholder proposals on political contributions were more
numerous among US investors in 2005).
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facilities.' 60 In all respects, however, the focus of shareholder activism on
climate change and any corporate response is strictly the business implications
of climate change.
V. REFLECTIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Climate finance is an essential part of the solution to global warming. So far,
most policy-makers and commentators have focused on the transactional side
of the financial sector, viewing investment institutions as mere brokers or
passive financiers of measures to mitigate or adapt to climate change. The
potential role of the financial sector as a means to stimulate far-reaching
changes in corporate behaviour through the example set by the long-standing
movement for SRI is only just starting to be seriously explored.
Certainly, in the financial sector there is growing awareness of climate
change as a threat to investment portfolios or as an opportunity to enhance
returns. Yet, even from this pragmatic business case approach to SRI, in
various ways investors remain hampered in dealing with global warming.
16 1
They may believe that climate change is too remote to affect a company's
bottom line, or that there are seemingly more pressing issues affecting
investment values. Another hindrance is the difficulties of determining the
implications of climate change, and government policy responses to it, for
financial markets. For instance, there is insufficient research demonstrating
the relationship between GHG emission regulations and investment returns.
Basic data may also be too imprecise for practical decisions. The present lack
of intergovernmental agreement on GHG emission targets beyond 2012, when
the Current Kyoto Protocol commitment period expires, also obstructs setting
a durable value on carbon reduction and climate adaptation measures.
We can discern two important insights from this exploration of climate
finance. First, in an acknowledgement of the limits of current approaches, the
World Business Council for Sustainable Development concedes that the
transition to a low carbon economy requires government policy instruments to
send the correct economic signals. 162 The market has struggled to capture and
reflect climate risks efficiently. These failures mean that financing renewable
energy supplies and energy efficiency technologies 'generally entail higher
risks and initial costs than conventional projects'.' 63 Government policies
160 Ford published its report on 2005, and claimed to have reduced carbon emissions from its
manufacturing facilities by 15 per cent, with further reductions planned, and was adopting
measures to improve the fuel efficiency of its cars: Ford Motor Company, Ford Report on the
Business Impact of Climate Change (Ford, Dearborn, Michigan, 2005) 3.
161 Innovest, Climate Change and the Financial Services Industry. Module 2-A Blueprint for
Action (UNEPFI, Geneva, 2002) 31-34.
162 World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), Energy and Climate
Change: Sharpening the Focus for Action-A Business Perspective (WBCSD, Geneva, 2005).
163 See Z Zhang and A Maruyama, 'Towards a Private-Public Synergy in Financing Climate
Change Mitigation Projects' (2001) 29 Energy Policy 1363.
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must therefore set a long-term value for carbon if the SRI market driven solely
by the business case is to be a force for change. Already, regulation and
litigation risks are major drivers for financiers to factor climate change into
their investment choices. The prospect of carbon emission caps, carbon taxes,
renewable energy subsidies, and mandatory corporate disclosures on climate
impacts-imposed by governments-are becoming crucial for the SRI market
on climate finance. This fact should remind us of how heavily SRI often
depends on market regulation. In this sense, SRI presents a paradox, having
emerged as a form of surrogate market regulation to compensate for the
lacunae of official regulation, yet often heavily dependent on the state to set
environmental standards necessary to stimulate the SRI market.
A second key insight is that the ethical issues posed by climate change have
been poorly acknowledged in the SRI movement (let alone by financial
markets generally). The business case approach to SRI, even at its most
efficient, will probably never be a satisfactory solution because it rests on
perpetuating the same economic system premised on infinite growth that has
wrought so much ecological damage. There must surely also be an ethical
envelope to climate finance, providing a normative framework for restraint to
safeguard ecological integrity and ensure social justice in entitlements to use
limited environmental resources.
Climate change is very much an ethical issue, as humankind's ability to
tamper with the earth's climate should raise profound questions about our
relationship with nature. 164 Indeed, the UNFCCC proclaims as one of its core
principles that: '[t]he Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit
of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and
in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities'. 1 65 Further, the question of who should shoulder the
primary burden of addressing climate change raises significant ethical ques-
tions of ensuring social and economic justice between developing and devel-
oped countries. 166 But the financial sector has been able to bypass such
uncomfortable questions that would raise doubts about the sustainability and
justice of our economic system. Instead, the climate finance discourse has
been carefully framed around business risks and investment opportunities.
There is nothing objectionable to investors financially benefiting from reduc-
ing their carbon footprint. The problem is that the business case will not
always provide sufficient motivation for change.
Such conclusions, of course, raise questions regarding what policy-makers
could do to make ethically-driven SRI on climate change more widespread in
financial markets. While the answer requires another article of much longer
164 P Taylor, 'The Business of Climate Change: What's Ethics Got to Do With It?' (2007),
20 Global Business and Development Law Journal 161.
165 Article 3.1 (1992) 31 ILM 849.
166 See L Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (Oxford
University Press, 2006).
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length, a few concluding comments can be briefly made. As a priority, re-
formers should target the fiduciary duties of investment institutions, for these
provide the very core legal standards that determine their basic economic
goals. One option would be to mandate the goal of sustainable development,
as the overall benchmark to hold financial investment to account. Thereby,
the fiduciary obligation to promote private returns must take into account
their public costs. But such a fiduciary standard must be underpinned by
concrete performance standards if it is to be workable. Vague stipulations to
'promote sustainability' would not suffice. They would likely be undermined
by discretionary interpretations on which financiers could not be legally
challenged. The advances in designing sustainable performance indicators in
environmental policy-making should be extended to financial investments.'
1 67
One such indicator is the carbon footprint of an investment portfolio--one of
the most powerful indicators of environmental performance.1 68 It would
surely also be necessary to democratize decision-making in financial insti-
tutions, giving more voice to ordinary fund members as well as to outside
third parties affected by their investments. This should enable other social
values to be considered in investment policies. Given the global scale of
modem financial markets, parallel reforms to fiduciary duties and investment
decision-making must be etched into new international legal rules governing
cross-border finance. The existing range of voluntary international standards
such as the UNPRI and the Climate Principles fall short of meeting the exacting
standards required. The current intergovernmental climate change negotia-
tions could provide a suitable forum to introduce some climate finance stan-
dards into international climate law.
In sum, while SRI suggests a more ambitious and enlightened role for
financial institutions on climate change issues, so far the SRI sector has made
a fairly limited and largely uninspiring contribution. SRI can not yet provide a
credible alternative to official regulation, but it could make a more useful
contribution with appropriate enabling legal reforms.
167J Keeble, S Topiol and S Berkeley, 'Using Indicators to Measure Sustainability
Performance at a Corporate and Project Level' (2003) 44 Journal of Business Ethics 149;
0 Schmid-Schonbein and A Braunschweig, EPI-Finance 2000; Environmental Performance
Indicators for the Financial Industry (E2 Management Consulting AG, Zirich, 2000).
168 Carbon footprints of investment portfolios are already been measures: Trucost, Carbon
Counts 2007: The Carbon Footprint Ranking of UK Investment (Trucost, London, 2007).
